The Bush Legacy: National Security

In looking back at national security policies during the Bush Years, the Council for a Livable World provides “the Good, the Bad and the Ugly.”

The Good

* For eight years, Congress stopped Bush proposals for a new generation of nuclear weapons, including small nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Bunker Buster (Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator) and the Reliable Replacement Warhead.

*The Bush Administration did not resume nuclear testing and did not withdraw the U.S. signature from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992.

* Congress made some reductions in missile defense money and placed severe restrictions on the third missile defense site in Europe.

* After six years of refusing to talk with North Koreans and that country testing a nuclear device, the Administration has negotiated for the past two years and achieved some progress.

* In 2008, in one of the few instances in which we were able to cooperate with the Bush Administration, our community worked with the Administration to ensure funding was included in a Supplemental Appropriations Bill to help North Korea proceed with its end of the bargain. Congress approved $53 million for energy assistance to the Pyongyang regime and authorized another $10 million for dismantlement work.

* The four horsemen, Kissinger, Schultz, Perry and Nunn, have created the space for moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons that both Obama and McCain endorsed during the 2008 campaign.

* There was no war with Iran.

* Congress refused to fund the administration's plan to build a new facility to produce annually 125 to 200 plutonium "triggers" or pits for nuclear weapons; at one time, the Administration planned to produce 450 plutonium pits per year. Congress drastically cut funding for reprocessing U.S. and foreign nuclear waste as part of a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program.

* Congress rejected a Pentagon request to put conventional warheads on Trident nuclear-powered submarines.

The Bad

* The Bush Administration refused to request Congress approve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

* The U.S.-India nuclear deal was approved and undermined anti-proliferation efforts.

* The Administration abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and began deployment of National Missile Defense in Alaska and California despite insufficient testing and no evidence that the system would work in realistic situations.

* The Administration undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by walking back from key promises the United States made in 1995 and 2000.

* The war in Iraq has continued for six years, and Congress was unable to end it.

* There were virtually no negotiations with Iran.

* There were eight years of unilateralism.

* The military budget has skyrocketed by 86% since 2001.

* Arms sales have dramatically increased. The United States’ share of the world arms trade has risen from 40 percent of arms deliveries in 2000 to nearly 52 percent in 2006. U.S. weapons exports rose about 45 percent to $33.7 billion in FY08, the highest total since 1993.

* The U.S. has failed to pay all its dues to the United Nations. In March 2008, the U.S. was $1.6 billion behind in its treaty obligations to the United Nations. The U.S.’s failure to pay its bills on time and in full could have a negative impact on key UN operations, including jeopardizing the 19 peacekeeping missions around the world.

* Congress continues to fund Cold War-era weapons systems, such as the F-22 Raptor, Virginia-class submarine and the V-22 Osprey, that have little purpose in the current security environment.

* The Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review expanded the possible use of nuclear weapons to counter terrorists and chemical and biological weapons attacks, and walked back from promises not to threaten to attack non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons.

The Ugly

* The Treaty of Moscow (SORT) produced inadequate reductions in Russian and American nuclear weapons with no verification and excess weapons on storage.

* The was some progress made helping the former Soviet states dismantle nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems and safeguard their nuclear materials, but the Administration tried to cut funding for the program more than once. Congress added funding during several years and removed some bureaucratic restrictions that had hampered the program.

* Congress launched two reevaluations of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, but the Perry-Schlesinger commission may be too divided to produce any productive conclusions.

* The Bush administration has used the supplemental funding process to an alarming degree to fund ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that sets a dangerous precedent for the future and threatens to further weaken the already-flawed federal budgeting process.

* The weak Proliferation Security Initiative only established a framework, which can be built upon, to stop the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies and fissile material, specifically when these items are being transported.

Inconvenient Truths

As reported in a recent must-read by Joshua Hammer in the Atlantic, “the investigation into the 2005 assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri is nearing its end--and a trial in international court looms. Insiders say the trail of evidence leads, ultimately, to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But having spent three years fearing for their lives, the investigators are now grappling with a different fear: that Western concerns about regional stability will prevent the naming of the biggest names.” On Slate, Christopher Hitchens offers his thoughts on the Hammer article and “the investigation that could blow up the Middle East.”

Here are the known facts: If you are a Lebanese politician or journalist or public figure, and you criticize the role played by the government of Syria in your country's internal affairs, your car will explode when you turn the ignition key, or you will be ambushed and shot or blown up by a bomb or land mine as you drive through the streets of Beirut or along the roads that lead to the mountains. The explosives and weapons used, and the skilled tactics employed, will often be reminiscent of the sort of resources available only to the secret police and army of a state machine. But I think in fairness I must stress that this is all that is known for sure. You criticize the Assad dictatorship, and either your vehicle detonates or your head is blown off. Over time, this has happened to a large and varied number of people, ranging from Sunni statesman Rafik Hariri to Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt to Communist spokesman George Hawi. One would not wish to be a "conspiracy theorist" and allege that there was any necessary connection between the criticisms in the first place and the deplorably terminal experiences in the second.

Hammer's article is good for a laugh in that it shows just how much trouble the international community will go to precisely in order not to implicate the Assad family in this string of unfortunate events. After all, does Damascus not hold the keys to peace in the region? Might not young Bashar Assad, who managed to become president after the peaceful death by natural causes of his father, become annoyed and petulant and even uncooperative if he were found to have been commissioning assassinations? Could the fabled "process" suffer if a finger of indictment were pointed at him? At the offices of the long-established and by now almost historic United Nations inquiry into the Hariri murder, feet are evidently being dragged because of considerations like these, and Hammer describes the resulting atmosphere very well.

Justice, Then Peace in Sudan

In the Christian Science Monitor, Ana Uzelac contends that we must first seek justice, then peace in Sudan. Meanwhile, an international warrant for Omar al-Bashir could speed his political demise.

The Hague - For almost two decades, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir has waged foul wars on ethnic groups within his country that happened to live on oil- or mineral-rich land. Today, the international community is finally close to holding him accountable. Though it could make for a rocky transition, it is the key to peace. Even before Darfur, aerial bombing, murder, and rape seemed to be his government's tools for settling scores with the mainly African Christians of southern Sudan. In that 23-year war for resource control, just under 2 million people died as a result of mass violence.

In 2005, the US brokered a peace deal that divided control of the oil fields. But it did not address the crimes committed. And by the time it was signed, Mr. Bashir was back to the same, in Darfur. This summer, however, things changed. The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, requested an arrest warrant against Bashir on suspicion of genocide. A flood of worst-case predictions followed. A fear that the situation will worsen has increased. And so have worries about chances for any meaningful peace process.

The pressure is now mounting on the United Nations Security Council to defer the ICC proceedings – as soon as this month – before the court judges decide the fate of the warrant request. This political emergency brake was meant to be used only when the interests of justice and peace collide. Bashir is clearly doing his best to convince the world that the call for his arrest will indeed collide with peace in Darfur. He recently sent a diplomatic mission to Security Council member states, promising renewed peace and possible deals. Back home, his troops attacked Darfur's largest refugee camp, killing dozens.

In fact, the most serious threat to peace and security in Sudan is Bashir himself. His regime has the power to make the Darfurians' life worse yet. It can also endanger international peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, upset the fragile peace in the south, and continue to destabilize its neighbor, Chad. In the past, Khartoum has often used its power in unsettling ways – and many believe that it would not hesitate to do it again.

But is pursuing the course of justice the right answer to this threat? Within the Security Council, divisions run deep on that question. About half of member states support a deferral, and many others still sit carefully on the fence. In order to credibly pull the brake on justice, the Security Council would have to promptly ensure real peace in Darfur, including a military force strong enough to back it up. Such a deal would have to offer the victims immediate security and relief. It would need to tackle the division of power and natural resources in order to create sustainable peace. And this time it would also have to address past crimes and guarantee that the country's rulers won't resort to genocide again.

It is doubtful whether Bashir would be ready to accept such terms. But anything less ambitious would undermine not only the ICC, but also the credibility of the member states that would allow it. A better option is to simply let the ICC do its job – while ensuring that the innocent in Darfur do not suffer the consequences of the regime's reaction to such a principled stand.

As the third sitting head of state to be suspected or indicted for war crimes, Bashir is the real watershed in the history of international justice. Allowing the court to decide on the issue of his criminal responsibility would mean that the two previous cases – Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Liberia's President Charles Taylor – were not oddities, but part of a genuine paradigm shift. It would make international justice a player and introduce new checks and balances into the unruly world of international relations. Equally important, this shift would send a clear message that genocide has become unforgivable.

There might also be some real political benefits in letting justice run its course. An international arrest warrant could erode Bashir's authority at home and abroad and speed up his political demise. The war crimes indictment surely hastened Mr. Milosevic's fall from power: It made him useless as an international negotiator. There is obviously no guarantee that in the case of Bashir the consequences would be as quick and beneficial. Sudan is a large, oil-rich state with needy and influential friends. But an arrest warrant would surely make some of his allies wonder about the wisdom of doing business with a fugitive.

And, yes, the prospect of an eventual change at the top of such a volatile country may seem unsettling. But the only stability under Bashir that Sudan has known is the one of repression, recurring armed conflict, and mass murder. The Sudanese president may have been moderately cooperative on the war on terror, but the price has been allowing him to terrorize others. His country and the millions of its war-tired citizens deserve a different future. And the US deserves a better ally.

Darfur's Best Hope

In a thoughtful piece in the Christian Science Monitor, Nathaniel Myers contends that, to end the crisis in Darfur, we must move to oust the Bashir government in Khartoum. In doing so, we should use the swearing in of a new special envoy for Sudan and a provision in the 2005 peace agreement to our advantage.

The United States and its allies on Darfur have long responded to Khartoum's obstructions with public complaints and reaffirmations of their commitment to the mission. Though well-intentioned, this approach has played into the (National Congress Party) NCP's hands. While American attention has been narrowly focused on the struggling peacekeeping mission, the NCP has been undercutting a potentially dramatic challenge to its rule - and with it, the greatest opportunity for lasting peace in Darfur. With the swearing in this month of a new special envoy for Sudan, Rich Williamson, it is time that America revisits its approach to Sudan – and recognizes that the peacekeeping mission should not be its exclusive focus.

As Mr. Bashir's latest provocation suggests, the problem in Darfur is one that ultimately cannot be resolved by peacekeepers. That's because its roots don't lie in local grievances or ethnic divisions – though both have fueled the fighting – but in the halls of power in Khartoum. The peacekeeping mission is urgently needed to improve immediate security, but lasting peace will come to Darfur and the rest of Sudan only when the country is led by a government genuinely committed to the cause. Remove the NCP from power and, as a senior UN official in Sudan told me recently, "the
problem in Darfur is over."

In most misgoverned nations, talk of such regime change would seem little more than a pipe dream – but remarkably, improbably, there exists in Sudan today a chance of revolution through the ballot box. Under the terms of an existing but neglected peace agreement, signed in 2005 to end the 21-year civil war between the Khartoum government and southern rebels, Sudan is obligated to hold a national election by July 2009. This peace deal, known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also promised the south a referendum on independence in 2011. Next year's election is essentially the last chance to stave off what will otherwise be a resounding vote for southern secession, by showing southerners that they will be allowed to compete for national power in a unified, democratic Sudan…

To be sure, it is hard to be optimistic that Bashir will ever permit an election that threatens his grip on power. But any vote, however flawed, will challenge the entrenched political order and give the opposition a chance to organize. Its conduct also represents the only scenario through which Sudan might survive as a unified state past the south's likely secession vote in 2011. And despite provocations such as this latest appointment, recent history shows that even the NCP can be influenced by a sustained campaign of targeted international pressure: Recall its eventual acquiescence to the UN peacekeeping mission.

With its current focus on peacekeepers, the Bush administration risks allowing this critical election to become just another broken NCP promise. The peacekeeping mission in Darfur is surely important, but if the US wants to see long-term peace in Sudan, the new special envoy must place greater emphasis on the implementation of the CPA and the conduct of a free, fair, and potentially regime-shattering election next year.

Then Came Darfur

As a recent PBS Frontline program opens - "The world vowed "never again" after the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities in Srebrenica, Bosnia. Then came Darfur."

As the LA Times reports, with an upcoming trip to Sudan later this month by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Sudanese President Bashir signaled his disrespect for the institution and its intentions with a political shot across the bow.

It's a bleak day for humanity when one of the architects of the genocide in Darfur gets a promotion. In a gesture of supreme defiance of decency and international law, the Sudanese government announced Monday that it had appointed Musa Hilal, a militia leader who recruited and mobilized the janjaweed militias responsible for the carnage in Darfur, to be a special advisor to the president on ethnic affairs. It gets worse. Hilal is the third alleged war criminal to be elevated to a government post. He is under United Nations and U.S. State Department sanctions; the other two have been indicted by the International Criminal Court.

In an especially cynical move, one of the indicted has been put in charge of humanitarian aid to Darfur. Sudan also has been doing everything possible to obstruct the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, including shooting at a clearly marked U.N. convoy this month. Appeasement and negotiation from a position of weakness have not and will not stop the thuggery of the oil-rich Sudanese regime. Only muscle will do. But the "civilized" world has done next to nothing to enforce meaningful economic sanctions, hasn't even moved to arrest the indicted war criminals and, disgracefully, has yet to provide even one of the helicopters that U.N. peacekeepers need. It's time to face facts: Unless the U.N. gets far more political, economic and military support from its posturing but so-far feckless members, it may as well pack up its blue helmets and go home.

If there was a time for the UN to live up to its charter - to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights - it is now. The atrocities being committed by Bashir and the janjaweed have been labeled genocide since 2004 by the US government yet President Bush and the UN remain slow to act. It's time for some backbone and it's time to do whatever it takes to get China (who has frequently prevented strong action on Sudan because of trade ties) on board. Multilateral sanctions against those responsible are a nice slap on the wrist but it's time we stop negotiating with a war criminal, do whatever it takes to alleviate the current cycle of genocide, and ensure the prompt prosecution of the Bashir thugs in an international court of justice.