A Wartime Transition

The NY Times recently solicited op-ed contributions from a number of national security experts. They provide interesting perspectives on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the many challenges and opportunities awaiting President-elect Obama.

Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, discusses the two-front war confronting the Obama Presidency.

He has less than two months to go from broad rhetoric to concrete day-to-day action. On Jan. 20, he will take over at a pivotal point in negotiating Iraq’s status of force agreement with the United States, in the middle of a winter military campaign in Afghanistan, and during a political, security and economic crisis in Pakistan. None of these issues will wait for America to deal with its financial problems. And no one involved believes that the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s northern territories can be fully won, or even transferred to Afghan and Pakistani hands, by even the end of President Obama’s first term. For at least the next two to three years, the war will intensify, and virtually all of the additional burden will be borne by the United States.
Leaks of a new National Intelligence Estimate have shown that we are now losing the war for several reasons: a lack of Afghan competence; a half-hearted Pakistani commitment to the fight; a shortage of American, NATO and International Security Assistance Force troops; too few aid workers; and nation-building programs that were designed for peacetime and are rife with inefficiency and fraud. This is why Gen. David McKiernan, the top commander in Afghanistan, and other military leaders have called for 20,000 to 25,000 more troops and warned that even those reinforcements may not be adequate.

Even with a potential drawdown in Iraq, the military is being stretched ever thinner. The Army already extends the deployment of troops beyond their commitments, and it and the Marine Corps may well find it impossible to meet their goals for shortening deployment cycles. As things stand, it will almost certainly take until 2011 to bring enough military advisers into Afghanistan to train its army and police forces to the level where locals can replace international troops. And with increasing terrorist attacks on non-governmental groups, many aid workers are being forced to leave the country.

…Even if the United States fully withdraws from Iraq in 2011, as Mr. Obama and the Iraqi government say they would like, we will remain on something very like a war footing there throughout the next presidency. While the combat burden on our forces will decline, withdrawal will be as costly as fighting. It will take large amounts of luck (and patient American prodding) for the Iraqi government to move toward real political accommodation while avoiding new explosions of ethnic and sectarian violence.

Even with progress on those fronts, we will have to withdraw while still helping to win a war, contain internal violence, limit Iranian influence and counter its nuclear program, create effective Iraqi security forces, and help Iraq improve its governance. Not a full war perhaps, but at least a quarter war in terms of continuing strains on our military and budget. ...In spite of recent progress under Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Mr. Rumsfeld’s inability to manage any key aspect of defense modernization has left the Obama administration a legacy of unfunded and expensive new trade-offs between replacing combat-worn equipment, repairing and rehabilitating huge amounts of weapons and equipment, and supplying our forces with new, improved equipment.

At best, President Obama will have to conduct the equivalent of one-and-a-quarter wars throughout his first term. At worst? The outside chance of war with Iran as well.

Fred Kagan, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, insists that we must capitalize on the common interests we share with Iraq vis-à-vis Iran.

Iraqis want to remain independent of Tehran, as they have now demonstrated by signing the agreement with the United States over Iran’s vigorous objections. They want to avoid military conflict with Iran, and so does America. Iraqis share our fear that Iran may acquire nuclear weapons, which would threaten their independence. And they resent Iran’s efforts to maintain insurgent and terrorist cells that undermine their government. Of course, the Iraqis recognize, as we do, that Iraq and Iran are natural trading partners and have a religious bond as majority Shiite. This may be to our benefit: the millions of Iranian pilgrims who will visit Iraqi holy sites at Najaf and Karbala over the coming years will take home a vision of a flourishing, peaceful, secular, religiously tolerant and democratic Muslim state.

The reintegration of Iraq into the Arab world is also under way. Many Arab states have already begun to open embassies in Baghdad. We should keep in mind that Iraq also shares interests with America regarding Saudi Arabia and Syria. Increasingly, Iraqi leaders speak quietly of replacing the Saudi kingdom as the dominant Arab state. Iraq also knows that Syria has allowed Al Qaeda fighters free passage across their common border for years, and has served as a staging base for Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Washington and Baghdad have a common interest in persuading the Syrian regime to abandon its support of terror groups.

America will withdraw its forces from patrolling in Iraq and will significantly reduce the number of soldiers there over the coming years — that is not and never has been in question. The timing and nature of that withdrawal, however, is extremely delicate. It is vital that we help see Iraq through during its year of elections, and avoid the temptation to “front-load” the withdrawal in 2009. It is equally vital that we develop a broader strategic relationship with Iraq using all elements of our national power in tandem with Iraq’s to pursue our common interests. President Obama has the chance to do more in Iraq than win the war. He can win the peace.

Peter Mansoor, former executive officer to General David Petraeus, discusses an appropriate American withdrawal from Iraq that will leave that country intact.

Barack Obama has the opportunity to recast American policy toward Iraq in a meaningful way, by providing much-needed support to its political center. His administration should view the new status of forces agreement between Washington and Baghdad as a means to shape the withdrawal of our combat forces while maintaining enough leverage to guide Iraq toward a more stable future.

…The key now is to sustain the momentum toward reconciliation, even while combat forces are withdrawn — a delicate balancing act. Although insurgent attacks have been appreciably reduced and Al Qaeda in Iraq is devastated, considerable distrust remains among various ethnic factions and religious sects and within the Iraqi government. As honest brokers, American forces keep the peace in key areas. Yet it is possible that we can complete their departure over three years, as envisioned in the status of forces agreement, assuming that the Iraqi Army has matured enough to take on added responsibilities.

Up to four brigades and their associated support — 20,000 to 25,000 troops — could be withdrawn in 2009, which would provide reinforcements for the war in Afghanistan. Withdrawals should then accelerate, as the division of power and resources is cemented locally across Iraq, with half the remaining combat forces and their associated support withdrawn in each of the following two years. By the end of 2011 — subject to Iraqi concurrence, of course — some 20,000 to 40,000 troops would remain for an extended period. These would be mainly military advisers, counterterrorist units, combat aircraft crews and support, and intelligence and logistical personnel.

Much of the stability in Iraq stems from a patchwork of agreements across the country between local leaders and the American military or the Iraqi government. To make sure that these agreements endure, the Iraqi government needs to prove to its people that it represents their interests in these ways: by ensuring adequate representation in political life of all sects and ethnicities in the political life; by incorporating a significant number of the Sons of Iraq (Sunnis who have supported the counterinsurgency) into the police forces and other government jobs; by providing tangible incentives for the return of Iraqi refugees from abroad; and by equitably distributing government funds and services to all areas of Iraq.

…Even as we pull troops out, the United States is not without significant leverage. We provide the Iraqi armed forces needed assets, from intelligence and logistics to air support and advisers; our civilian advisers are helping to improve the efficiency of the Iraqi government; our global diplomatic leverage can help Iraq in a number of ways; and Washington can encourage business investment in Iraq, particularly in its dilapidated oil industry.

To nudge the Iraqi government in the right direction, the new administration must let it know, quietly but firmly, that the blank check given by the Bush administration is no longer in force. It should make clear that we, too, want to see the expeditious withdrawal of American combat forces, but only in a manner that ensures Iraq will not again dissolve into chaos and civil war. Long-term American diplomatic, economic and military support should be contingent on a comprehensive political solution with a fair division of power. The alternative — a sectarian Shiite government that marginalizes other sects and ethnicities and is perhaps aligned with Iran as well — is
unacceptable.

Lessons of the Past

In a recent column in the Post, Charlie Wilson draws upon the lessons learned from the 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan and makes the point that “a strong military alone is not enough to ensure our long-term national security.”

In a scene near the end of the movie "Charlie Wilson's War," after the mujaheddin victory over the invading Soviet military, congressional appropriators turn down my request for funds to rebuild Afghanistan's schools, roads and economy. If we had done the right thing in Afghanistan then -- following up our military support with the necessary investments in diplomacy and development assistance -- we would have better secured our own country's future, as well as peace and stability in the region.

In reality, this decision played out over several years and involved many people, but the scene makes clear what a mistake we made. Sure, the problems facing Afghanistan and the region were tough -- feuding warlords, the opium crop and the shift in our attention to the Persian Gulf War. But the Afghans, with our weapons, had done nothing less than help precipitate the collapse of the Soviet Union. And instead of intensifying our diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to help the Afghans meet their postwar challenges, we simply walked away -- leaving a destroyed country that lacked roads, schools, and any plan or hope for rebuilding.

Into this void marched the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and we all know what happened after that. Today, fledgling democracies -- be it Afghanistan or Georgia -- face similar danger. We simply cannot make the same mistake.

The lesson here is about more than the good manners of reciprocating a favor. It takes much more to make America safe than winning on the battlefield. Had we remained engaged in Afghanistan, investing in education, health and economic development, the world would be a very different place today. The aftermath of a congressional committee's decision so long ago has turned out to be a warning that America is not immune to the problems of the very poorest countries. In today's world, any person's well-being -- whether he or she is in Kandahar, Kigali or Kansas -- is connected to the well-being of others.

Yet, as we commit troops to the "war on terror," America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development continue to be chronically undermanned and underfunded. We spend 1 percent of the federal budget on these critical elements of our foreign policy, compared with 22 percent on the military and weapons.

While I have always believed in and fought for a strong defense, I know that we cannot rely on the military alone to keep us secure. As the situations in Afghanistan and Georgia suggest, our future threats are likely to come from states that cannot meet the basic needs of their people. We can avoid the need to spend so much on our military -- and put so many of our soldiers in harm's way -- simply by investing more in saving lives, creating stable societies and building economic opportunity. This strategy won't resolve the conflict in Georgia today, but it could help America prevent similar crises in the future…

Robust investments in health, education and economic development are critical elements of our national security. I hope the message of our experiences in Afghanistan will resonate with the next president, whoever he is, as he puts in place his strategic vision for America's role in the world.

Confronting Our True Enemies

Yesterday on the floor of the U.S. Senate, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid issued the following statement regarding the misplaced foreign policy priorities of Bush-McCain Republicans:

“Over the August recess, I had the opportunity to travel to Afghanistan. During my trip, I met with some of our generals and troops who are fighting on the front lines every day. During those meetings, they reinforced for me their courage and determination to win the fight against the Taliban and the terrorists. I also learned more about the determination of the Afghan people. One part of the trip took me to a vocational school, where young Afghani men and women were receiving training in English, computers, car repair and other skills so that they could help pull their families – and their country – out of poverty and toward a brighter day.

“Despite years of chaos and bloodshed, despite many families torn apart by war, the young people I met were still brimming with hope. Seeing these young men and women study together, I was reminded of the difference the United States has made by aiding their fight against the Taliban. The courage of our troops and the Afghan people was inspiring. But there was another conclusion that I could not avoid: the progress I saw is being terribly undermined by deteriorating security. I returned to America more convinced than ever that the greatest threat to our national security lies in Afghanistan and Pakistan – and these places must be our central focus. Today, one day from the seventh anniversary of the most violent terrorist attack ever to take place on American soil, the mastermind of that attack – Osama Bin Laden – remains free.

“For all the tough rhetoric of chasing Bin Laden to the gates of hell, the Bush Administration has failed to put the necessary resources and manpower into the hunt for America’s No. 1 enemy. President Bush has rightly said that the war on terror is about more than just one man. Yet seven years after 9/11, the President has allowed that one man’s vast al Qaeda network regroup in its safe haven in Pakistan. And in Afghanistan, the sad fact is that the Taliban – the brutally oppressive regime that housed Bin Laden and al Qaeda – is on the rise, attacking our troops and innocent Afghan civilians.

“We must be clear-eyed in our realization that the very same people who attacked us then continue to regain strength and threaten us now. This dire situation could have been avoided. When President Bush took us into Afghanistan following September 11th, Democrats, our country and the world stood with him. We knew it was a fight we must wage and win. But after a series of military victories, the President lost focus and turned instead to an ill-conceived war in Iraq. With the job unfinished in Afghanistan, the President devoted our troops and treasure to another battlefield. Predictably, with focus shifted, Afghanistan began to backslide, with neighborhoods once reclaimed from the enemy becoming battlegrounds once again.

“The reason for these failures is no mystery. No matter how hard the Republican spin machine tries to rewrite history and obscure the truth, the fact is that the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 were in Afghanistan, not Iraq. Yet George Bush, John McCain and their Republican allies chose to shift our resources away from where our enemy lives and into a place that had nothing to do with al Qaeda.

“Afghanistan is a far larger country than Iraq, with a much larger population, and far rougher terrain. Yet today, we have 34,000 American forces in Afghanistan and 146,000 in Iraq. Afghanistan is much poorer than Iraq – one of the poorest countries in the world – yet we have spent $170 billion in Afghanistan, and nearly $650 billion in Iraq. Afghanistan is the home of Al Qaeda, the home of the Taliban, and the central front of the War on Terror. Yet there are more than three times as many troops in Iraq and we have spent nearly four times as much money there.

“The result of this Republican failure is clear: after a drop in violence early in the Afghanistan war, the Taliban came back with a vengeance in mid-2006. By that time, we didn’t have enough troops on the ground to respond. The troops we needed were 1,500 miles away, in Iraq. The commander of American forces in the region, Admiral William Fallon, put it this way in January: ‘Back in 2001, early 2002, the Taliban were pretty much vanquished. But my sense looking back is that we moved focus to Iraq, which was the priority from 2003 on, and the attention and the resources focused on a different place.’

“With resources focused on a different place, as Admiral Fallon said, here is what we are now seeing: In July, nearly twice as many U.S. troops were killed in Afghanistan than in Iraq; June was the second deadliest month in Afghanistan for coalition and U.S. forces since the start of the war; In Eastern Afghanistan, attacks on coalition troops increased by 40 percent over the first five months of this year; Roadside bombings have increased; and Opium production is up, with Afghanistan producing 93 percent of the world’s opium.

“And President Bush’s failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have had consequences beyond the borders of those two countries. This morning, the bipartisan American
Security Project issued a report noting that attacks by violent terrorist groups around the world are at an all time high – and this is without counting terrorist attacks in Iraq or Afghanistan. Their report also notes that ungoverned spaces continue to provide sanctuary for terrorist organizations, including Afghanistan, East and North Africa, and Somalia.

“Yesterday, President Bush had one last chance to meaningfully change his strategy and begin to reverse all these backsliding trends. He chose not to. He chose to stick with the status quo and not make significant changes. And unfortunately, we have seen no reason to believe that a John McCain presidency would offer any break from the failed Bush foreign policy.

“For all his talk about listening to the commanders on the ground, George Bush is dangerously deaf to the calls of our commanders in Afghanistan. In the words of Admiral Mullen, ‘I’ve made no secret of my desire to flow more forces, U.S. forces, to Afghanistan just as soon as I can, nor have I been shy about saying that those forces will not be available unless or until the situation in Iraq permits us to do so.’

“We know today that no more than a token shift of troop levels will take place until we have a new President committed to winning the war on terror by fighting the actual terrorists. That will require a new approach to Iraq, Afghanistan, and also Pakistan.

“We have seen in Pakistan a dangerous approach by President Bush of placing all our bets on one man – General Musharraf. That was a fatal and avoidable blunder. Musharraf did not implement democracy, did not uphold human rights and did not stop the terrorists operating inside Pakistan’s borders. American dollars meant to fight terrorism were wasted. The Pakistani people suffered, and the United States lost credibility with them for supporting a dictator who did not uphold their basic rights. Because of President Bush’s failed approach to Pakistan, we have now seen al Qaeda regroup within its borders.

“According to the declassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate of July 2007 titled ‘The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,’ al Qaeda has ‘protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in the Pakistani Federal Administered Tribal Areas.’ The intelligence agencies reiterated this a few weeks ago, saying that al Qaeda ‘has maintained or strengthened key elements of its capability to attack the United States in the past year.’

“During our time in Afghanistan, from our meetings with President Karzai to our meetings with American generals, one message was clear: we cannot solve the problem in Afghanistan without solving the problem in Pakistan.

“Those concerned with the writing of our history books will have ample opportunity to delve into the Bush failures in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan in far greater detail than I have done in my remarks. The historians will note that on George Bush’s watch, the Taliban grew stronger, running their operations from terrorist bases inside Pakistan. They will note that under George Bush’s watch, al Qaeda regrouped, ready to carry out other attacks against the United States. And they will note that on George Bush’s watch, our national security was jeopardized and the threats that led to the attacks in 2001 are as grave if not graver in 2008.

“Our job in Congress is not to do the job of the historians, but to answer one question: Where do we go from here? President Bush gave his answer to that question yesterday. His answer was: we don’t go anywhere. We stay exactly where we are.

“John McCain has made it clear that he stands in place with George Bush. With due respect due to the President and Senator McCain, the status quo has failed. They are out of touch with the realities and ramifications of our efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“I saw in Afghanistan a people eager, desperate and ready to lift their country to democracy, equality and economic opportunity, but held down by the weight of an enemy we failed to destroy. I hope that in the coming months, our courageous, overworked, overstretched, overstressed troops can continue to hold off the enemy without the full resources and manpower necessary to complete the mission. And I hope that the American people will have the wisdom to choose a leader who will take the war on terror back to the terrorists and look the Afghan people in the eye and say that help is on the way.”

Shuffling Priorities

In August, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, Barack Obama laid out several of his foreign policy priorities in a speech titled “The War We Need to Win.” In that speech, he spoke of the increasing violence in Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, and the lawless sanctuaries in Pakistan that have devolved into safe-havens for al-Qaeda and into launching points from which militants attack U.S. forces.

"Let me make this clear: There are terrorists holed up in those mountains, that murdered 3,000 Americans. If we have actionable intelligence about high-valued terrorist targets and if President Musharraf will not act, we will."

Obama was quickly ridiculed and criticized for his 'naïve recklessness'. Hillary Clinton: “I don’t think it was a particularly wise position to take” because “he basically threatened to bomb Pakistan.” John McCain, who told crowds at every campaign stop that he would follow Osama bin Laden to the gates of Hell, asked "Will we risk the confused leadership of an inexperienced candidate who once suggested bombing our ally, Pakistan?"

In the end, was Barack Obama really so naïve? As reported today:

President George W. Bush secretly approved U.S. military raids inside Pakistan against alleged terrorist targets, according to a former intelligence official with recent access to the Bush administration's debate about how to fight al-Qaida and the Taliban inside the lawless tribal border area.

The Times:

President Bush secretly approved orders in July that for the first time allow American Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani government, according to senior American officials. The classified orders signal a watershed for the Bush administration after nearly seven years of trying to work with Pakistan to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and after months of high-level stalemate about how to challenge the militants’ increasingly secure base in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

American officials say that they will notify Pakistan when they conduct limited ground attacks like the Special Operations raid last Wednesday in a Pakistani village near the Afghanistan border, but that they will not ask for its permission. “The situation in the tribal areas is not tolerable,” said a senior American official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the delicate nature of the missions. “We have to be more assertive. Orders have been issued.”

The new orders reflect concern about safe havens for Al Qaeda and the Taliban inside Pakistan, as well as an American view that Pakistan lacks the will and ability to combat militants. They also illustrate lingering distrust of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies and a belief that some American operations had been compromised once Pakistanis were advised of the details.

In the words of Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Afghanistan and Pakistan "are inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them. Until we work more closely with the Pakistani government to eliminate the safe havens from which they operate, the enemy will only keep coming."

To highlight the direness of the situation, he issued an even more blunt statement: “I’m not convinced we’re winning in Afghanistan. [But] I am convinced we can.” To that end, he has ordered a comprehensive military strategy to better address the growing threat from the border region. The Post elaborates:

On the day after President Bush announced he will cut troops in Iraq and bolster them in Afghanistan between now and early 2009, Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates also signaled that they would give increasing priority to the Afghan war and the expanding insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. "The war on terror started in this region. It must end there," Gates told the committee.

Violence has mounted for more than two years in Afghanistan from an increasingly sophisticated and brazen insurgency, one fueled by havens in Pakistan. As a result, the war is exacting a worsening toll on coalition forces, with the number of U.S. troop deaths projected to surpass last year's high of 117. So far this year, 109 troops have died. U.S. and NATO troops remain hampered by manpower shortages, a lack of helicopters and a disjointed chain of command.

"Frankly, we are running out of time," Mullen said, adding that not sending U.S. reinforcements to Afghanistan is "too great a risk to ignore."

He said the new influx of U.S. forces into Afghanistan that Bush announced Tuesday -- an Army brigade and Marine battalion with a total of about 4,500 troops -- does not meet the demands of commanders there, but is "a good start." Already, total U.S. forces in Afghanistan have grown from 21,000 troops in 2006 to nearly 31,000 today.

The Iraq Debate

As debate over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan begin to take center stage in the election, the differences between the two strategies championed by each candidate become more and more obvious. The centerpiece of the McCain strategy is a rigid adherence to the Bush doctrine. The centerpiece of the Obama strategy (who has sought to clarify his policies prior to his upcoming trip to Europe and the Middle East) is to draw down troops in Iraq and take the fight back to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Obama: "By any measure, our single-minded and open-ended focus on Iraq is not a sound strategy for keeping America safe. As should have been apparent to President Bush and Sen. McCain, the central front in the war on terror is not Iraq, and it never was. Our troops and our NATO allies are performing heroically in Afghanistan, but I have argued for years that we lack the resources to finish the job because of our commitment to Iraq. I will make the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban the top priority that it should be. This is a war that we have to win."

As we've seen and will undoubtedly continue to see throughout the course of this campaign, the McCain response to any foreign policy challenge will be 1) to tout his military service as the trump card that makes him an unquestioned expert on military strategy, and 2) to remind the world that Barack Obama is a weak defeatist who would rather surrender than fight the tough war that needs to be fought.

McCain: "Sen. Obama will tell you we can't win in Afghanistan without losing in Iraq. In fact, he has it exactly backward. It is precisely the success of the surge in Iraq that shows us the way to succeed in Afghanistan. I know how to win wars. And if I'm elected president, I will turn around the war in Afghanistan, just as we have turned around the war in Iraq, with a comprehensive strategy for victory.”

While we should be encouraged that McCain even acknowledged the challenges that confront us in Afghanistan, most of his comments don’t carry much water. “Obama will tell you we can’t win in Afghanistan without losing in Iraq?” What is McCain’s definition of winning and losing? Apparently winning consists of being bogged down in an open-ended war that is costing us thousands of lives and billions from our treasury and not is making us safer. In fact, it’s making us less safe because it’s degrading our military to almost unprecedented levels and preventing us from focusing on our true threats. Meanwhile, to McCain, losing apparently consists of confronting our true enemies and doing what is in the best security interests of our nation.

“The success of the surge in Iraq shows us the way to succeed in Iraq.” Actually, the surge in Iraq shows us why we’re losing in Afghanistan. Despite having al-Qaeda on the ropes, U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan have always played second fiddle to their counterparts in Iraq in respect to the focus and the resources required to accomplish their mission. And McCain is always quick to cite the tremendous success of the surge in Iraq but fails to mention the events beyond our patrol that significantly contributed to the decline in violence as well as the fact that the underlying goal of the surge – long-term political reconciliation by Iraqi leaders – has never been achieved.

In stark contrast to the Bush-McCain stubbornness and recklessness, Obama laid out his plan for Iraq earlier this week:

The call by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki for a timetable for the removal of American troops from Iraq presents an enormous opportunity. We should seize this moment to begin the phased redeployment of combat troops that I have long advocated, and that is needed for long-term success in Iraq and the security interests of the United States.

The differences on Iraq in this campaign are deep. Unlike Senator John McCain, I opposed the war in Iraq before it began, and would end it as president. I believed it was a grave mistake to allow ourselves to be distracted from the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban by invading a country that posed no imminent threat and had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Since then, more than 4,000 Americans have died and we have spent nearly $1 trillion. Our military is overstretched. Nearly every threat we face — from Afghanistan to Al Qaeda to Iran — has grown.

In the 18 months since President Bush announced the surge, our troops have performed heroically in bringing down the level of violence. New tactics have protected the Iraqi population, and the Sunni tribes have rejected Al Qaeda — greatly weakening its effectiveness.

But the same factors that led me to oppose the surge still hold true. The strain on our military has grown, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and we’ve spent nearly $200 billion more in Iraq than we had budgeted. Iraq’s leaders have failed to invest tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues in rebuilding their own country, and they have not reached the political accommodation that was the stated purpose of the surge.

The good news is that Iraq’s leaders want to take responsibility for their country by negotiating a timetable for the removal of American troops. Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. James Dubik, the American officer in charge of training Iraq’s security forces, estimates that the Iraqi Army and police will be ready to assume responsibility for security in 2009.

Only by redeploying our troops can we press the Iraqis to reach comprehensive political accommodation and achieve a successful transition to Iraqis’ taking responsibility for the security and stability of their country. Instead of seizing the moment and encouraging Iraqis to step up, the Bush administration and Senator McCain are refusing to embrace this transition — despite their previous commitments to respect the will of Iraq’s sovereign government. They call any timetable for the removal of American troops “surrender,” even though we would be turning Iraq over to a sovereign Iraqi government.

But this is not a strategy for success — it is a strategy for staying that runs contrary to the will of the Iraqi people, the American people and the security interests of the United States. That is why, on my first day in office, I would give the military a new mission: ending this war.

As I’ve said many times, we must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in. We can safely redeploy our combat brigades at a pace that would remove them in 16 months. That would be the summer of 2010 — two years from now, and more than seven years after the war began. After this redeployment, a residual force in Iraq would perform limited missions: going after any remnants of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, protecting American service members and, so long as the Iraqis make political progress, training Iraqi security forces. That would not be a precipitous withdrawal.

In carrying out this strategy, we would inevitably need to make tactical adjustments. As I have often said, I would consult with commanders on the ground and the Iraqi government to ensure that our troops were redeployed safely, and our interests protected. We would move them from secure areas first and volatile areas later. We would pursue a diplomatic offensive with every nation in the region on behalf of Iraq’s stability, and commit $2 billion to a new international effort to support Iraq’s refugees.

Ending the war is essential to meeting our broader strategic goals, starting in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the Taliban is resurgent and Al Qaeda has a safe haven. Iraq is not the central front in the war on terrorism, and it never has been. As Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently pointed out, we won’t have sufficient resources to finish the job in Afghanistan until we reduce our commitment to Iraq.

As president, I would pursue a new strategy, and begin by providing at least two additional combat brigades to support our effort in Afghanistan. We need more troops, more helicopters, better intelligence-gathering and more nonmilitary assistance to accomplish the mission there. I would not hold our military, our resources and our foreign policy hostage to a misguided desire to maintain permanent bases in Iraq.

In this campaign, there are honest differences over Iraq, and we should discuss them with the thoroughness they deserve. Unlike Senator McCain, I would make it absolutely clear that we seek no presence in Iraq similar to our permanent bases in South Korea, and would redeploy our troops out of Iraq and focus on the broader security challenges that we face. But for far too long, those responsible for the greatest strategic blunder in the recent history of American foreign policy have ignored useful debate in favor of making false charges about flip-flops and surrender.

It’s not going to work this time. It’s time to end this war.

Republicans and Our Enemies

In response to a foreign policy commentary from Joe Lieberman titled “Democrats and Our Enemies”, Senator Joe Biden responded with a Wall Street Journal op-ed of his own. The title? “Republicans and Our Enemies” of course…

On Wednesday, Joe Lieberman wrote on this page that the Democratic Party he and I grew up in has drifted far from the foreign policy espoused by Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and John Kennedy. In fact, it is the policies that President George W. Bush has pursued, and that John McCain would continue, that are divorced from that great tradition – and from the legacy of Republican presidents like Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Sen. Lieberman is right: 9/11 was a pivotal moment. History will judge Mr. Bush's reaction less for the mistakes he made than for the opportunities he squandered. The president had a historic opportunity to unite Americans and the world in common cause. Instead – by exploiting the politics of fear, instigating an optional war in Iraq before finishing a necessary war in Afghanistan, and instituting policies on torture, detainees and domestic surveillance that fly in the face of our values and interests – Mr. Bush divided Americans from each other and from the world.

At the heart of this failure is an obsession with the "war on terrorism" that ignores larger forces shaping the world: the emergence of China, India, Russia and Europe; the spread of lethal weapons and dangerous diseases; uncertain supplies of energy, food and water; the persistence of poverty; ethnic animosities and state failures; a rapidly warming planet; the challenge to nation states from above and below.

Instead, Mr. Bush has turned a small number of radical groups that hate America into a 10-foot tall existential monster that dictates every move we make. The intersection of al Qaeda with the world's most lethal weapons is a deadly serious problem. Al Qaeda must be destroyed. But to compare terrorism with an all-encompassing ideology like communism and fascism is evidence of profound confusion. Terrorism is a means, not an end, and very different groups and countries are using it toward very different goals. Messrs. Bush and McCain lump together, as a single threat, extremist groups and states more at odds with each other than with us: Sunnis and Shiites, Persians and Arabs, Iraq and Iran, al Qaeda and Shiite militias. If they can't identify the enemy or describe the war we're fighting, it's difficult to see how we will win.

The results speak for themselves. On George Bush's watch, Iran, not freedom, has been on the march: Iran is much closer to the bomb; its influence in Iraq is expanding; its terrorist proxy Hezbollah is ascendant in Lebanon and that country is on the brink of civil war. Beyond Iran, al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan – the people who actually attacked us on 9/11 – are stronger now than at any time since 9/11. Radical recruitment is on the rise. Hamas controls Gaza and launches rockets at Israel every day. Some 140,000 American troops remain stuck in Iraq with no end in sight.

Because of the policies Mr. Bush has pursued and Mr. McCain would continue, the entire Middle East is more dangerous. The United States and our allies, including Israel, are less secure. The election in November is a vital opportunity for America to start anew. That will require more than a great soldier. It will require a wise leader. Here, the controversy over engaging Iran is especially instructive.

Last week, John McCain was very clear. He ruled out talking to Iran. He said that Barack Obama was "naïve and inexperienced" for advocating engagement; "What is it he wants to talk about?" he asked. Well, for a start, Iran's nuclear program, its support for Shiite militias in Iraq, and its patronage of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

Beyond bluster, how would Mr. McCain actually deal with these dangers? You either talk, you maintain the status quo, or you go to war. If Mr. McCain has ruled out talking, we're stuck with an ineffectual policy or military strikes that could quickly spiral out of control. Sen. Obama is right that the U.S. should be willing to engage Iran on its nuclear program without "preconditions" – i.e. without insisting that Iran first freeze the program, which is the very subject of any negotiations. He has been clear that he would not become personally involved until the necessary preparations had been made and unless he was convinced his engagement would advance our interests.

President Nixon didn't demand that China end military support to the Vietnamese killing Americans before meeting with Mao. President Reagan didn't insist that the Soviets freeze their nuclear arsenal before sitting down with Mikhail Gorbachev. Even George W. Bush – whose initial disengagement allowed dangers to proliferate – didn't demand that Libya relinquish its nuclear program, that North Korea give up its plutonium, or even that Iran stop aiding those attacking our soldiers in Iraq before authorizing talks.

The net effect of demanding preconditions that Iran rejects is this: We get no results and Iran gets closer to the bomb. Equally unwise is the Bush-McCain fixation on regime change. The regime is abhorrent, but their logic defies comprehension: renounce the bomb – and when you do, we're still going to take you down. The result is that Iran accelerated its efforts to produce fissile material. Instead of regime change, we should focus on conduct change. We should make it very clear to Iran what it risks in terms of isolation if it continues to pursue a dangerous nuclear program but also what it stands to gain if it does the right thing. That will require keeping our allies in Europe, as well as Russia and China, on the same page as we ratchet up pressure.

It also requires a much more sophisticated understanding than Mr. Bush or Mr. McCain seem to possess that by publicly engaging Iran – including through direct talks – we can exploit cracks within the ruling elite, and between Iran's rulers and its people, who are struggling economically and stifled politically. Iran's people need to
know that their government, not the U.S., is choosing confrontation over cooperation. Our allies and partners need to know that the U.S. will go the extra diplomatic mile – if we do, they are much more likely to stand with us if diplomacy fails and force proves necessary.

The Bush-McCain saber rattling is the most self-defeating policy imaginable. It achieves nothing. But it forces Iranians who despise the regime to rally behind their leaders. And it spurs instability in the Middle East, which adds to the price of oil, with the proceeds going right from American wallets into Tehran's pockets. The worst nightmare for a regime that thrives on tension with America is an America ready, willing and able to engage. Since when has talking removed the word "no" from our vocabulary?

It's amazing how little faith George Bush, Joe Lieberman and John McCain have in themselves – and in America.

Our Troops as Propaganda

As he has unfortunately been prone to do, the President used our troops as a convenient backdrop again yesterday. The obvious ploy, which seeks to create the impression that the men and women of the military wholeheartedly endorse his policies over the Democrats decried in his speeches, rings a little hollow considering they have no choice in the matter. Nevertheless, despite its shamelessness, it creates the impression he wants so it continues.

As reported yesterday:

"We should be able to agree that our troops deserve America's full support," Bush said at an outdoor ceremony on a massive field lined with members of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. "And that means that the United States Congress needs to pass a responsible war funding bill that does not tie the hands of our commanders and gives our troops everything they need to complete and accomplish the mission."

…In his speech to troops, Bush defended his war policy and said that when it comes to deciding troop levels in Iraq, his message to commanders remains: "You will have all the troops, you will have all the resources you need to win."

Each time the President offers unlimited resources and manpower to those in Iraq, you have to wonder what the Afghans and the servicemembers fighting in Afghanistan think about that. It not only undermines what they are trying to accomplish but it cheapens their service by making their efforts (on the true front-lines of the war on terror) an afterthought. It’s time that the President finally provide all of our servicemembers, regardless of where they serve, with a policy that is more worthy of their sacrifice.

2008 and the Stakes for America’s Security

At a recent speech at Georgetown, Senator Joe Biden delivered a speech entitled “2008 and the Stakes for America’s Security.” It’s an articulate condemnation of the Bush foreign policy from the Senate Foreign Relations Chairman.

“It’s great to be back at Georgetown, which has done such a wonderful job educating one of my sons, and several of my nieces and nephews. I hope that all that tuition will translate into, if not “Biden Hall,” then at least a student lounge. I want to thank a few people for making this event possible: President Jack Degioia, Dean Bob Gallucci; VP of Federal Relations Scott Flemming; the College Democrats and their President Adam Feiler; and the Georgetown Lecture Fund. After you hear me speak, you may want to blame them.

When people say ‘this is the most important election in my lifetime’, they’re right. So much is at stake. The physical security of our children. The retirement security of our parents. The economic and health security of our families. And, above all else, the national security of our country, which is a President’s first responsibility.

I start from a simple premise: we cannot afford another four years of Republican stewardship of our nation’s security. After eight years of the Bush Administration, our country is less secure and more isolated than it has been at any time in recent history. This administration has dug America into a very deep hole – with very few friends to help us climb out.

It doesn’t have to be this way. The next President will have an awesome responsibility – but also the greatest opportunity since FDR – to change the direction of our country… and the world. It starts with a much clearer understanding of how the world has changed over the past two decades. As Yeats wrote in “Easter 1916” our world has “changed utterly, a terrible beauty has been born.”

The emergence of China and India as major economic powers. The resurgence of Russia floating on a sea of oil. A unifying Europe. The spread of dangerous weapons and lethal diseases. The shortage of secure sources of energy, water and even food. The impact of climate change. Rising wealth and persistent poverty. A technological revolution that sends people, ideas and money hurtling around the planet at ever faster speeds. The challenge to nation states from ethnic and sectarian strife. The struggle between modernity and extremism.

That’s a short list of the forces shaping the 21st century. No one country can control these forces, but more than any other country, we have an ability to affect them - if we use the totality of our strength. Our military might and economic resources are necessary but not sufficient to lead us into this new century. It is our ideas and ideals that will allow us to exert the kind of leadership that persuades others to follow and to deal effectively with these forces of change. Over the next few months, I’ll speak in detail about how Democrats will exert that kind of leadership.

For today, I want to concentrate on this administration. It has squandered our ability to shape this new world. It has put virtually all of these issues on the back burner, failing to devote the intellectual capital and constant effort they require. It has destroyed faith in America’s judgment. And it has devalued America’s moral
leadership in the world.

Instead, this administration has focused to the point of obsession on the so-called “war on terrorism” and produced a one-size-fits-all doctrine of military preemption and regime change ill suited to the challenges we face. It has made fear the main driver of our foreign policy. It has turned a deadly serious but manageable threat – a small number of radical groups that hate America – into a ten-foot tall existential monster that dictates nearly every move we make. Even if you look at the world through this administration’s distorted lens, you see a failed policy.

This failure flows from a dangerous combination of ideology and incompetence and a profound confusion about whom we’re fighting. It starts with the very language the President has tried to impose: “the global war on terror.” That is simply wrong. Terrorism is a means, not an end, and very different groups and countries are using it toward very different goals. If we can’t even identify the enemy or describe the war we’re fighting, it’s difficult to see how we will win.

The most urgent threat is the intersection of the world’s most radical groups -- like Al Qaeda -- with the world’s most lethal weapons. But we also must confront groups that use terror not to target us directly, but to advance their own nationalistic causes. We must deal with outlaw states that support them and otherwise flout the rules. We must face a civil war in Iraq, a renewed war for Afghanistan, and an ideological war for the future of Pakistan. We must help resolve a historic conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

And we must contend with Iran, especially its efforts to acquire the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. This administration spent five years fixated on changing the Iranian regime. No one likes the regime, but think about the logic: renounce the bomb – and when you do, we’re still going to take you down. The result is that Iran accelerated its efforts to produce fissile material and is closer now to the bomb than when Bush took office. Instead of regime change, we should focus on conduct change. We should make it very clear to Iran what it risks in terms of isolation if it continues to pursue a dangerous nuclear program but also what it stands to gain if it does the right thing.

That will require keeping our allies in Europe, as well as Russia and China, on the same page as we ratchet up pressure. But is also means doing much more to reach out to Iran – including through direct talks – to exploit cracks within the ruling elite and between Iran’s rulers and its people, who are struggling economically and stifled politically. The Iranian people need to know that their government, not the United States, is choosing confrontation over cooperation.

Saber rattling is the most self-defeating policy imaginable. It forces Iranians who despise the regime to rally behind their leaders and spurs instability in the Middle East, which adds to the price of oil, with the proceeds going right into Tehran’s pockets. The worst nightmare for a regime that thrives on isolation and tension is an America ready, willing and able to engage. It’s amazing how little faith this administration has in the power of America’s ideas and ideals.

All these fronts throughout the Middle East and South Asia are connected. But this administration has wrongly conflated them under one label, and argued that success on one front ensures victory on the others. It has lumped together, as a single threat, extremist groups and states more at odds with each other than with us. It has picked the wrong fights at the wrong time, failing to finish a war of necessity in Afghanistan before starting a war of choice in Iraq.

The result is that, to quote the findings of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on the Terrorist Threat: “Al Qaeda is better positioned to strike the West… [it has] regenerated… and remains determined to attack us at home.” Of course, we must destroy Al Qaeda. But instead of rolling back the threat it poses, this administration’s approach has helped produce a global breakout of extremism, which now threatens more people in more places than it did before 9-11. So even on its own terms, the national security strategy of this administration has been a failure. We cannot afford four more years.

Last month, a man I greatly admire and consider a friend, Senator John McCain, set out his vision for our foreign policy. To his credit, John repudiates some of the Bush administration’s approach to the world. He recognizes that the power of our example is as important as the example of our power… that allies we respect, not disdain, can advance our interests. He is especially eloquent about his abhorrence for war – as John is uniquely placed to be.

But John McCain remains wedded to the Bush Administration’s myopic view of a world defined by terrorism. He would continue to allow a tiny minority to set the agenda for the overwhelming majority. It is time for a total change in Washington’s world view. That will require more than a great soldier. It will require a wise leader.
Nowhere is this truer than in Iraq. The war dominates our national life. It stands like a boulder in the road between us and the credibility we need to lead in the world and the flexibility we require to meet our challenges at home. When it comes to Iraq, there is no daylight between John McCain and George W. Bush. They are joined at the hip. When it comes to Iraq, there will be no change with a McCain administration… and so there is a real and profound choice for Americans in November.

Like President Bush, Senator McCain likes to talk about the dire consequences of drawing down our forces in Iraq. He argues that Iraq is the meeting point for two of the greatest threats to America: Al Qaeda and Iran. It’s an argument laden with irony. After all, who opened Iraq’s door to Al Qaeda and Iran? The Bush administration.

“Al Qaeda in Iraq” is a Bush-fulfilling prophecy: it wasn’t there before the war, but it is there now. As to Iran, its influence in Iraq went from zero to sixty when we toppled Saddam’s Sunni regime and gave Shi’ite religious parties inspired and nurtured by Iran a path to power. No matter how we got to this point, President Bush and Senator McCain argue that if we start to leave, it will further empower Al Qaeda and Iran.

I believe they are exactly wrong. And so do a large number of very prominent retired military and national security experts who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee this month. Would drawing down really strengthen ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq’ and give it a launching pad to attack America? Or would it help eliminate what little indigenous Iraqi support ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq’ retains?

Most Sunni Arabs have turned on ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq’, alienated by their tactics and ideology. AQI is down to about 2000 Iraqis and a small number of foreigners whose almost exclusive focus is Iraq. When we draw down, the most likely result is that
Iraqis of all confessions will stamp out its remnants – and we can retain a residual force in or near Iraq to help them finish the job.

Last week, I asked our ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, to tell us where al Qaeda poses a greater threat to America’s security: in Iraq, or in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He said: Afghanistan and Pakistan. So what about Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan – the people who actually attacked us n 9-11? If we draw down, would they be emboldened?

Or, to paraphrase the National Intelligence Estimate on Terrorism, would they lose one of their most effective recruiting tools -- the notion that we’re in Iraq to stay, with permanent military bases and control over the oil? And would they finally risk the full measure of America’s might?

Senator McCain has taken a lot of heat for saying he would not mind if American troops stay in Iraq for a hundred years. The truth is, he was trying to make an analogy to our long term presence in peaceful post-war Germany, post-armistice Korea and post-Dayton Bosnia. But Germany, Korea or Bosnia after the peace are nothing like Iraq today – with thousands of bombs, hundreds of American injured and dozens of American killed every month -- and there is little prospect Iraq will look like them anytime soon.

Worse, saying you’re happy to stay in Iraq for one hundred years fuels exactly the kind of dangerous conspiracy theories about America’s intentions throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds that we should be working to dispel.

What about Iran? Would drawing down increase its already huge influence in Iraq? Or would it shift the burden of helping to stabilize Iraq from us to them and make our forces a much more credible deterrent to Iran’s wider misbehavior? The idea that we could or even should wipe out every vestige of Iran’s influence in Iraq is a fantasy. Even with 160,000 American troops in Iraq, our ally in Baghdad greets Iran’s leader with kisses. Like it or not, Iran is a major regional power and it
shares a long border – and a long history – with Iraq.

Right now, Iran loves the status quo, with 140,000 Americans troops bogged down and bleeding, caught in a cross fire of intra Shi’a rivalry and Sunni-Shi’a civil war. The challenge for us is not eliminating all Iranian influence in Iraq, but forcing Iran to confront the specter of a disintegrating Iraq or all-out war between different Shi’a factions. By drawing down, we can take away Iran’s ability to wage a proxy war against our troops and force Tehran to concentrate on avoiding turmoil inside Iraq’s borders and instability beyond them.

Finally, would our responsible draw down accelerate sectarian chaos? Or would it cause Iraq’s leaders and Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors to finally act responsibly? To date, both have used our large presence as a crutch or an excuse for inaction. When that stops, they will have to start to fill the vacuum or put their interests at much
greater risk. We should debate the consequences of drawing down in Iraq. But more importantly, we should talk about what both President Bush and Senator McCain refuse to acknowledge: the increasingly intolerable costs of staying.

The risks of drawing down are debatable. The costs of staying with 140,000 troops are knowable – and they get steeper every day: The continued loss of the lives and limbs of our soldiers; The emotional and economic strain on our troops and their families due to repeated, extended tours, as Army Chief of Staff General George Casey recently told Congress; The drain on our Treasury – $12 billion every month; The impact on the readiness of our armed forces – tying down so many troops that, as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Richard Cody said, we don’t have any left over to
deal with a new emergency; The inability to send enough soldiers to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Al Qaeda has regrouped and is plotting new attacks.

When I visited Afghanistan in February, General McNeil, who commands the international force, told me that with two extra combat brigades – about 10,000 soldiers – he could turn around the security situation in the south, where the Taliban is on move. But he can’t get them because of Iraq. Even when we do pull troops out of Iraq, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, says he would want to send them home for a year to rest and retrain before sending them to Afghanistan. The longer we stay in Iraq, the more we put off the day when we fully join the fight against the real Al Qaeda threat and finally defeat those who attacked America seven years ago.

It is long past time to clearly define our interests in Iraq. It is not in our interest to intervene in an internal power struggle among Shi’a factions. It is not in our interest to back one side or the other, or get caught in the cross fire of a Sunni-Shi’a civil war. It is in our interest to start to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind. Even if we could keep 140,000 troops in Iraq, they will not be the deciding factor in preventing chaos. Instead, we need to focus all our remaining energy and initiative on achieving what virtually everyone agrees is the key to stability in Iraq: a political power sharing agreement among its warring factions.

I remain convinced that the only path to such a settlement is through a decentralized, federal Iraq that brings resources and responsibility down to the local and regional levels. We need a diplomatic surge to get the world’s major powers, Iraq’s neighbors and Iraqis themselves invested in a sustainable political settlement.

Fifteen months into the surge that President Bush ordered and Senator McCain embraced, we’ve gone from drowning to treading water. We are no closer to the President’s stated goal of an Iraq that can defend itself, govern itself and sustain itself in peace. We’re still spending $3 billion every week and losing 30 to 40 American lives every month.

We can’t keep treading water without exhausting ourselves and doing great damage to our other vital interests around the world. That’s exactly what both the President and Senator McCain are asking us to do. They can’t tell us when, or even if, Iraqis will come together politically, which was the purpose of the surge in the first place. They can’t tell us when, or even if, we will draw down below pre-surge levels. They can’t tell us when, or even if, Iraq will be able to stand on its own two feet. They can’t tell us when, or even if, this war will end.

Most Americans want this war to end. They want us to come together around a plan to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind. They’re not defeatists. They’re patriots who understand the national interest – and the great things Americans can achieve if we responsibly end a war that we should not have started.

I believe it is fully within our power to do that. Then, with our credibility restored, our alliances repaired and our freedom renewed, we will once again lead the world. We will once again address the hopes, not play to the fears, of our fellow Americans. That is my hope for next November – and for the country we all love.

May God bless America and protect our troops.

National Insecurity

As compiled by the National Security Network, “five new reports from various government agencies and independent organizations were released this week, all confirming that the Bush Administration has weakened the security of the United States.”

The reports were: 1) Government Accountability Office: the Bush Administration has no plan for defeating al-Qaeda its central haven in Pakistan; 2) National Defense University: Iraq War is a debacle; 3) Rand Corporation: 300,000 American troops have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; 4) House Armed Services: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan are poorly managed; and 5) Refugees International: The humanitarian crisis in Iraq is worsening. Some excerpts:

Government Accountability Office: Bush Administration Has No Plan for Defeating the Terrorist Threat

The Executive Branch has failed “to develop a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power” to defeat terrorism. The GAO found that “no comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA [Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas] has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007).” Despite these mandates, “. . . neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—called for by the various national security strategies and Congress.”

Al-Qaeda has succeeded in re-constituting itself in the safe-haven of Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they are putting the finishing touches on its plan to attack the United States. The GAO “found broad agreement, as documented in the unclassified 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), State and embassy documents, as well as among Defense, State, and other officials, including those operating in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA.” In addition, the GAO report cites testimony from the Director of National Intelligence, which says that “al Qaeda is now using the Pakistani safe haven to put the last element necessary to launch another attack against America into place.”

Independent Report from the National Defense University: Iraq Conflict a “Major War, and a Major Debacle”

The Iraq War has profoundly weakened the United States. The NDU report, written by a former aide to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, found that the Iraq War has weakened the U.S. across the board: “Globally, U.S. standing among friends and allies has fallen,” and “our status as a moral leader has been damaged…” Additionally, the war has had a “…negative impact on all other efforts in the war on terror, which must bow to the priority of Iraq… ” and “our Armed Forces— especially the Army and Marine Corps—have been severely strained…” Worst of all, while the war was described as necessary to secure the safety of the United States, our efforts in Iraq have become “... an incubator for terrorism and have emboldened Iran to expand its influence throughout the Middle East.”

Post-Invasion strategy has been as flawed as the decision to go to war itself. “To date, the war in Iraq is a classic case of failure to adopt and adapt prudent courses of action that balance ends, ways, and means. After the major combat operation, U.S. policy has been insolvent, with inadequate means for pursuing ambitious ends.”

RAND Corporation: The War in Iraq has Done Tremendous Harm to the Health of our Armed Servicemen

The Iraq War has done great trauma to the mental health of hundreds of thousands of service members. According to a study conducted by the RAND Corporation, it is likely that over 300,000 armed service members have Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and an estimated 320,000 individuals suffered traumatic brain injury during their deployment. “Assuming that the prevalence found in this study is representative of the 1.64 million service members who had been deployed for OEF/OIF as of October 2007, we estimate that approximately 300,000 individuals currently suffer from PTSD or major depression and that 320,000 individuals experienced a probable TBI during deployment."

All too often, service members carrying these invisible scars do not receive adequate care. “Even when individuals receive care, too few receive quality care. Of those who have a mental disorder and also sought medical care for that problem, just over half received a minimally adequate treatment. The number who received quality care (i.e., a treatment that has been demonstrated to be effective) would be expected to be even smaller. Focused efforts are needed to significantly improve both accessibility to care and quality of care for these groups. The prevalence of PTSD and major depression will likely remain high unless greater efforts are made to enhance systems of care for these individuals.”

House Armed Services Committee Report: Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Crucial to US Efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, are Under-Resourced and Poorly Coordinated

PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq lack “strategic guidance.” “The PRT program lacks strategic guidance and oversight. The Department of Defense and the Department of State have not established clearly defined objectives and milestones for Provincial Reconstruction Teams for achieving larger operational and strategic goals. Nor have they adopted a system for measuring PRT effectiveness and performance.”

Reconstruction initiatives suffer from unpredictable access to funding and poor coordination. “PRTs operate under complicated and, at times, unclear chains of command. The lack of unity of command negatively impacts unity of effort, which can result in uncoordinated, and even counterproductive, outcomes.” Moreover, the Armed Services Committee Report found that in spite of their broad set of responsibilities, PRTs have neither had “predictable funding streams” nor “an appropriate mix of well-trained military and civilian staff.”

Refugees International: Iraqi Government is ‘Party’ to a Worsening Humanitarian Crisis

Study contradicts Bush Administration claims; militias, not Iraqi government, are primary providers of humanitarian assistance. “As a result of the vacuum created by the failure of both the Iraqi government and the International Community to act in a timely and adequate manner, non-state actors play a major role in providing assistance to vulnerable Iraqis. Militias of all denominations are improving their local base of support by providing social services in the neighborhoods and towns they control. Through a ‘Hezbollah-like’ scheme, the Shiite Sadrist movement has established itself as the main service provider in the country.” Aided by these patronage operations, Iraqi militias “are also recruiting an increasing number of civilians to their militias - including displaced Iraqis.”

Sectarian Iraqi Government has contributed to the humanitarian disaster. “The Government of Iraq is itself a party to the conflict and its security forces have facilitated displacement and sometimes carried it out themselves. Officers in the Iraqi Security forces complain that most of their men are loyal to the Mahdi Army and most of their commanders are loyal to the Mahdi Army or the Badr Militia. They and Sunni groups described incidents where Iraqi Security Forces opened fire on Sunni neighborhoods, protected death squads, or were directly involved in the kidnapping and execution of Sunni civilians.”

Follow-Up: A Fracturing Alliance

Responding to the controversy ignited by his recent comments regarding NATO allies fighting in Afghanistan (captured in a previous post), Secretary Gates is quickly back-tracking.

U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates lauded NATO's mission in Afghanistan and heaped praise on Canada and other members of the alliance in a bid to stem the controversy he sparked with critical comments about the allies' ability to fight a counterinsurgency war against the Taliban. Mr. Gates told the Los Angeles Times in an interview published Wednesday that Canadian, Dutch and British troops are ill-suited for the fierce counterinsurgency war they are waging in southern Afghanistan, setting off international anger and a full-blown, damage-control exercise by the Pentagon.

Gates now claims it was a matter of semantics and that he wasn't singling out any nation.

“We have to acknowledge the reality that the alliance as a whole has not trained for a counterinsurgency operation, even though individual countries have considerable expertise at and success in this arena. Our allies, including the Canadians, the British, the Dutch the Australians and others, are suffering losses as they demonstrate valour and skill in combat."

Gates' ill-advised comments were dangerously provocative and came at a most inconvenient time. While he should be commended for recognizing his misstep (something his predecessor would have refused), he must not further complicate the already tremendous burden of fighting two wars with a military at its breaking point. It is because of this burden that we need our allies more than ever. And to publicly castigate those who sacrifice alongside American troops can only serve as a disincentive for others to join the fight.

A Fracturing Alliance

While the Taliban is undoubtedly experiencing a resurgence in Afghanistan and now operates virtually unmolested in the tribal areas of Pakistan, NATO forces appear to be splintering amid US criticisms of the fortitude and effectiveness of non-US forces. These criticisms have sprung from American frustrations over the growing violence in Afghanistan and a reluctance by NATO allies to deploy more forces or take on a greater combat role. To counter an expected offensive by the Taliban this Spring, the Administration recently chose to deploy an additional 3,200 Marines to southern Afghanistan. A move they hope will reassure allies who have questioned our commitment, and increase the likelihood those allies will follow suit.

The Post reports: The U.S. plan to send an additional 3,200 Marines to troubled southern Afghanistan this spring reflects the Pentagon's belief that if it can't bully its recalcitrant NATO allies into sending more troops to the Afghan front, perhaps it can shame them into doing so.

According to the Pentagon Spokesperson, Geoff Morrell: "It is our hope that our allies in NATO and other partners . . . in Afghanistan will see what more they can do to add forces to bring down the shortfall that will exist even after we deploy these additional Marines.” This would include, "at the very least," sending forces to replace the Marines when they leave at the end of this year.”

But this is where American diplomacy gets interesting and a bit wayward… In one breath, US officials castigate our allies for a lack of commitment in Afghanistan. In the next, they publicly criticize the abilities and performance of allies with troops on the ground who are fighting and suffering significant casualties.

The Post reports: What's more, Mr. Gates and other senior Pentagon officials seem to have concluded that the three NATO countries that have been willing to operate in the south -- Britain, Canada and the Netherlands -- have been relatively ineffective. Mr. Gates told the Los Angeles Times this week that "most of the European forces, NATO forces, are not trained in counterinsurgency"; the Pentagon believes they are too averse to casualties, too reluctant to patrol and too dependent on artillery and airstrikes. The Post's Karen DeYoung reported that U.S. commanders criticize British troops for failing to retain control over areas taken from the Taliban and for advancing a "colonial" strategy of backing local militias rather than working with the national Afghan army.

European diplomats and NATO's defenders furiously respond that the American complaints are unfounded. Almost all of the alliance's members have increased their commitment to Afghanistan in the past year, they point out, helping to raise the troop level under NATO command from 33,000 to 41,000. The troubles in the south, they say, are the result of NATO forces penetrating an area that U.S. commanders had neglected, allowing the Taliban to flourish. British officials say their strategy in Helmand province is comparable to the successful U.S. alliances with Sunni militias in Iraq.

This new American diplomatic approach is viewed with increasing disdain by a world community (including many high-ranking US military officials) that believes the US invasion of Iraq was the turning point in the war in Afghanistan – the ultimate contributor to the rising violence and the growing influence of the Taliban. With bin Laden on the ropes, Al-Qaeda in shambles, and the Taliban all but out of business, US military might, attention, and resources were siphoned away from Afghanistan at a time when they were most needed. The ensuing events shouldn’t have come as a big surprise.

“After more than six years of coalition warfare in Afghanistan, NATO is a bundle of frayed nerves and tension over nearly every aspect of the conflict, including troop levels and missions, reconstruction, anti-narcotics efforts, and even counterinsurgency strategy. Stress has grown along with casualties, domestic pressures and a sense that the war is not improving.”

Despite the daunting challenges, our troops continue to perform admirably in Afghanistan. For once, it would be nice if our civilian leadership and diplomatic efforts were more worthy of their sacrifice.

Taliban Resurgence

The Bhutto assassination and the growing instability in Pakistan have cast renewed attention on the Taliban, whose resurgence has steadily picked up steam while U.S. forces have prioritized their attention and resources in Iraq. This weekend's New York Times Magazine has an interesting article on the Taliban's reach into Pakistan and the split between the moderate and fundamental Islamists. Also, Frontline produced a fascinating series (which can be viewed online) on the "Return of the Taliban", along with links to supplemental information such as interviews, maps, etc.