A Tenuous Peace

It's widely recognized that one of the significant benchmarks toward reconciliation and stability in Iraq is the ground-laying for new elections. The political and security landscape has changed dramatically since the last elections, new players need to be brought in (particularly Sunnis), and local leadership needs to be provided to a growing majority of Iraqis who are distrustful of the current regime that has largely isolated itself in Baghdad. But as Iraq moves toward new elections, jockeying by key players (both Shia and Sunni) could undoubtedly risk many of our recent gains toward peace and stability.

In the south, representatives of Muqtada al-Sadr recently met with members of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the largest Shiite political party led by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim. The Shiite militias controlled by these two factions (Sadr’s Mahdi Army and Hakim’s Badr Organization) have been in a turf battle since the onset of the war but signed a “tenuous peace agreement” following bloody clashes in Karbala that left 52 dead this summer. The subsequent cease fire declared by Sadr gave him time to weed out renegade factions within his ranks and is one of the key factors in the reduced levels of violence in Baghdad and the south. But it’s unclear how long that will last as Sadr will undoubtedly do everything in his power prior to new elections to shore up his support and ensure his interests are represented. Those moves would be countered by Hakim who would desperately want to secure his role as the ultimate political power-broker. The recent meetings between their factions should give us some glimmer of hope that both sides recognize the stabilizing factor a peace between them would bring.

Meanwhile, rivalries amongst Sunnis in Anbar have created a situation just as precarious. While today’s relative stability can be credited to the tribal sheiks (dubbed “the Awakening”) who rose up against al-Qaeda, those same sheiks are responsible for fueling the insurgency that killed thousands of Iraqi and Coalition forces in the first years of the war. These sheiks, who boycotted the initial elections, now want a piece of the pie – a move that will be undoubtedly be countered by those Sunnis who participated in the elections and cooperated with Coalition forces from day one. Most of these Sunnis, members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, are viewed as corrupt by the sheiks, who have grown increasingly disgruntled because their communities are not receiving a fair share of reconstruction funds and basic services. The sheiks believe this is happening because they essentially have no representation in the government in Baghdad. Thus they would approach new elections with a different mindset and would seek to “gain back” some of the political influence that has subsequently been accumulated by the Iraqi Islamic Party.

So while new elections in Iraq are essential to any sort of long-lasting stability, we should also prepare for the short-term chaos and violence that they could also bring.